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downturn.  Using social structure of accumulation theory, a qualitative institutional 
analysis, and quantitative time-series models, this article investigates historically-
contingent relations between the nature of public assistance, family economic 
deterioration, and capital accumulation.  To sustain the circuit of capital, I argue that the 
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Introduction 
 The “Great Recession” of the United States that began in December 2007 was 
preceded by mounting social and economic problems of middle- and working-class 
families.  While those who perpetually live in or near poverty are further marginalized 
during deep recessions, the most recent economic downturn swelled these ranks with 
middle-income households.  These “typical” American families who contributed to the 
resurging U.S. economy following the Great Depression and World War II, now 
exemplify the economic deterioration leading to the most recent recession. 
 When compared historically, contradictions emerge between the economic 
conditions for the reproduction of families and for the reproduction of profitability within 
an expanding capitalist society.  Family income from employment has experienced a 
decade-long decline as both capital accumulation and consumer debt have dramatically 
increased.  For example, between 1948 and 2007, the proportional share of total income 
held by poor and working class families, the lowest 40 percent, decreased by 18.8 percent 
as the top 5 percent, the economic elite, experienced a 17.5 percent increase (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2009).  Moreover, the ratio of total household debt to asset values increased from 
18 cents to 55 cents per dollar as after-tax corporate profits rose over 600 percent (Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 2009; Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2010a).  As the latest 
validation of these trends, the “Great Recession” exposed the ongoing deteriorating 
conditions of existence for low-, working-, and middle-income families as a social class.   
 Therefore, this research investigates these contradictions and their historical 
conditions by asking: Why has the economic condition of the family in the United States 
deteriorated after World War II?   
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A growing body of work on the political and economic shifts prior to the “Great 
Recession” concentrates on financial programs devised by investors, often in relation 
with governmental bureaucrats or elected officials (McLean and Nocera 2010; Sorkin 
2009).  Inclusive of historical and comparative accounts of economic crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009) and the on-going housing crisis (Kotz 2009), a broad, historical concept of 
the family is missing from most of this work.  Some social-economic research reflects the 
importance of banking and credit for low-wage households (Blank and Barr 2009), and 
the associated growth of debt poverty (Goodman 2009; Pressman and Scott 2009b), yet 
literature on the macro-economic links between financial institutions and the family 
institutions within the circuit of capital is inadequate (Barba and Pivetti 2009).    
To address this gap and the research question, I first present an historical-
institutional conception of the family and, using social structure of accumulation theory, 
conduct a qualitative institutional analysis of the political economy of the family in the 
United States after World War II.  Next, four quantitative time-series models investigate 
historically-contingent relations between family economic deterioration, shifts in income 
assistance, and financial deregulation.  I argue that the family, when needed, was once 
able to access public support and cash assistance to reproduce labor in the circuit of 
capital.  However, conditioned by financial deregulations, waning public welfare, and 
stagnating wages from employment in the late 1970’s to the “Great Recession” 
institutionalized consumer lending practices maintained the family as a durable market, 
even as their economic wellbeing was mired under unprecedented levels of debt.   
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Theoretical Frame: The Historical-Institutional Family and SSA Theory 
Typical attention by the social sciences on the economic conditions of families is 
on the lived experiences of poor, near poor or low-income families (Collins and Mayer 
2010; Wilson 1996), especially single-mother families in the welfare system (Hays 2003; 
Sidel 2006; Turner, Danziger, and Seefeldt 2006) and the downward mobility of middle-
class families within changing labor markets (Newman 2006; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; 
Warren and Tyagi 2003).   Where the literature includes certain family groups within 
specific social institutions, minimal attention has been given to the economic conditions 
of the family combining the poor, near-poor, and working- and middle-classes. 
These limitations could stem from traditional family research that concentrates on 
individuals within families, broader kinship groups, and their immediate social milieu 
(White and Klein 2008).  Other social-institutional analyses range from rational choice 
and econometric models of probable individual behavior (Almond 2006; Becker 1991) to 
grand, functionalist conceptions within an interdependent cohesive system (Parsons and 
Bales 1955; Swenson 2004).  When applied, these approaches often link the economic 
deterioration of families to inferior investments in human capital or the requirements of 
social differentiation (Collins 1975).   
The family as a political and economic social institution is more complex, and to 
analyze the contradictions between capital accumulation and family economic 
deterioration, an historical-institutionalist approach is preferred.  This approach links 
qualitative circumstances with quantitative associations to analyze the structural, 
historical, and material conditions of existence for families (Marx 1998; Mills 1959).  
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As U.S. capitalist society develops over time, the economy became its major 
organizing factor and extended periods of prosperity and growth link the needs of 
capitalist profit and accumulation to the supportive contributions of families.  The 
political economy impacts the nature of institutions as the capitalist mode of production 
shapes the development of the family as a social institution within the circuit of capital 
(Creed 2000).  Foremost, no other enterprise or industry exists within capitalist society 
specializing in the production and reproduction of human labor as an input to the 
production of commodities and services or for their subsequent consumption.  The 
political and economic realities of the U.S. capitalist system following WWII promoted a 
middle-class family as an ideal through marriage and childbearing norms, patterns of 
socialization, and expanding consumer credit to foster consumption.  Backed by 
educational, housing, financial, and other social programs, the family was re-established 
in somewhat changed form as the primary institution for social reproduction (Coontz 
1992).   
At historical moments, the competitive and innovative nature of capitalist 
development promoted, supported, and benefitted unevenly from these essential 
reproduction, socialization, or consumption roles of the family institution (Dickinson and 
Russell 1986; Engels [1884] 2001; Zaretsky 1976).  Therefore, this framework analyzes 
such historically-contingent political and economic shifts in the family-capital 
relationship, and the dialectical character of circumstances that both shape and are shaped 
by families attempting to fulfill their institutional roles while within their conditions of 
existence.  
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Social structure of accumulation theory posits that at particular historical 
moments a distinctive set of economic, social, and political institutions, a social structure 
of accumulation (SSA), come together in a phase of consolidation providing conditions 
necessary for strong and persistent capital accumulation by regulating class conflict and 
competition.  Over time, SSAs become ever more complex due to inherent contradictions 
and labor/citizen unrest, and ultimately breakdown leading to economic decline during 
the decay phase, which overlaps with a following lengthy period of institutional 
restructuring during the exploration phase.  Eventually a new SSA consolidates fostering 
renewed economic growth (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982).  SSA theory, anchored in 
Marxist economics, combined capital-labor relations within the mode of production with 
historically-contingent social institutions that mitigate contradictory social conditions.   
SSA theorists (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1990) have provided a detailed 
analysis of the period of sustained economic growth immediately after World War II—
the post-WWII SSA in the United States.1  This SSA has four institutional pillars—a 
limited capital-labor accord, the capitalist-citizen accord, Pax Americana, and muted 
inter-capitalist rivalry.  Supported by a financial regulatory structure, these core 
institutions impinge most directly on capital accumulation (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 
1982; Wolfson 1994).  The critical position of the state to support accumulation has been 
discussed within core SSA institutions, but has been undertheorized.  O’Connor’s (1973) 
theory of the capitalist state is argued here to be consistent with the SSA approach, where 
stable conditions amenable for accumulation are a product of the state’s contradictory 
fiscal legitimization and accumulation roles (Carlson, Gillespie, and Michalowski 2010).  
However, these roles are not solely fiscal, but part of broader strategic policy 
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interventions attempting to balance relations between class factions (Gough 1979; Jessop 
2007).  The capitalist state is therefore a welfare state within a modified capitalist-state-
citizen accord to balance the wellbeing of capital and citizens and generate conditions 
necessary for a vigorous circuit of capital.   
Theoretically, the family intersects the capital-labor and capitalist-citizen accords, 
and the financial regulatory structure.  However, SSA theory, rooted in Marxist 
economics, has focused on class conflicts between labor and capital, with minimal 
consideration of household labor and internal family dynamics below an institutional 
level (Kotz 1994; O'Hara 1995).  To supplement SSA theory, the historical-institutional 
family reproduced current and future labor power for the capital-labor accord, socialized 
members within the capitalist system, and provided a durable market for consumption.  
Bolstered by access to credit and banking, middle-class families supported system 
stability and legitimacy within their conditions of existence. 
Institutional Analysis: Family Economic Deterioration over the Post-WWII SSA 
Preceding Exploration: 1933-1948 
 A consolidated SSA is the product of its preceding exploration phase.  For the 
post-WWII SSA, the 1933-1948 period of exploration, including core years of the Great 
Depression and World War II, generated high levels of structural unemployment and 
labor unrest, conditions addressed by the National Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and Taft-Hartley Act.  This capital-labor accord targeted enterprises most 
fundamental to economic growth, allowed labor to organize and bargain collectively, 
provided job safety and security, and, for families, real wages and cost of living increases 
were indexed to productivity, balancing production with new norms of consumption.  The 
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capitalist-state-citizen accord, through the Social Security Act, mediated labor-market 
risks for families with social insurance for the unemployed and in old age and means-
tested public assistance through Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and General 
Assistance when breadwinners were displaced from the labor force.  To generate 
confidence and stabilize demand the Glass-Steagall Banking Act compartmentalized the 
banking industry and restrained interest rates, the Securities and Exchange Act 
established federal oversight of banks and markets, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation promoted thrift.  Finally, the National Housing Acts of 1934 and 1938 
institutionalized the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA) to promote the home-ownership.   
 In sum, the New Deal created a capitalist welfare state and the means for laboring 
and middle class families to support the reproduction of labor power with the 
consumption of capitalist goods, simultaneously fortifying the circuit of capital and 
aggregate demand.  However, the post-WWII SSA only included those families covered 
by the capital-labor and capitalist-state-citizen accords.  Access to real living wages, job 
security, health, education, and a family home left agricultural workers, domestic 
servants, the self-employed, small business owners, and their employees at the margins.  
For the latter, work was reinforced by restricting aid and relief necessitating their labor 
power in low-wage sectors.  Through both sets of relations, capital was provided an 
adequate supply of labor for stratified positions, and durable, but unequal, markets for 
consumption (Katz 1996). 
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Consolidation: 1948-1966 
 The consolidation phase of the post-WWII SSA was a period of rising 
productivity, corporate profits and investments, low inflation and unemployment, and 
increasing real wages (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1990).  Accordingly, labor rights, 
employment for displaced workers, and pay equity expanded the capital-labor accord 
through the Landrum-Griffin Act, Manpower Development and Training Act, and the 
Equal Pay Act.  Social Security Act amendments replaced ADC with Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and, with the Federal Food Stamp Program, and 
Medicare and Medicaid health insurance programs for the aged and the poor, broadened 
the capitalist-state-citizen accord to previously excluded families.  For the first time, poor 
mothers were given access to public assistance despite linking most benefits to 
community service or work obligations (Neubeck 2006).  Provisions to support 
reproduction and socialization were built into the financial regime which separated 
commercial banking and insurance and extended interest rate caps on savings accounts.   
Finally, civil rights reforms created rent supplements and banned housing discrimination.  
Despite these placative measures, the capitalist welfare state continually 
rebalanced private profitability with class compromises to maintain a surplus of low-
wage labor.  Families at the margins of the economic trajectory endured inequalities 
between capital and the lower-classes, between men and women, and between whites and 
non-whites.  By 1966, the post-WWII accords provided a selective safety net for 
working- and middle-class families but challenged poor families to sufficiently perform 
their reproduction, socialization, and consumption roles within these contradictions of 
capital accumulation. 
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Decay: 1966-1979 
SSA theorists argue that the decay of the post-WWII SSA occurred in two distinct 
sub-phases, the first from 1966 overlapping in 1973 with the second, which ended in 
1979 (McDonough 2008).  In the first sub-phase of decay, a race- and gender-based wage 
gap developed between the core manufacturing and industrial firms and secondary sector 
of marginalized labor propelling civil and welfare rights, black power, and feminist 
groups to demand economic justice by directly challenging the capital-labor and 
capitalist-state-citizens accords.  A series of court rulings ended restrictive practices 
denying poor single mothers and families of color access to public assistance, stressing 
welfare rolls with a stark increase in recipients. In turn, capital could no longer depend on 
this marginal pool of low-wage labor and, in 1967 the Work Incentives Program (WIN) 
offered recipients voluntarily work opportunities in exchange for certain welfare benefits.  
Four years hence, amendments to the WIN program required recipients to work for 
welfare; directly benefitting capital, work was no longer voluntary for families.   
The second sub-phase of decay was in part the result of strategic challenges to 
power relations between capital, the state, citizens, and families.  Growing inflation and 
rising citizen unrest contributed to a severe recession in the early 1970s.  Social spending 
was constrained at the same time capital cut wages, formally challenged union power, 
and relocated manufacturing to areas in the West, Southwest, and abroad where labor was 
weak (Piven and Cloward 1997).  As a result, the fates of working and middle class 
families generated a dilemma for the federal government—sustain legitimacy by 
upholding the post-WWII SSA, or address the economic imperative for capital 
accumulation.  The response signaled a shift in the conditions of existence for families.   
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Demands for consumption now outweighed demands for labor power.  Capital, 
seeing corporate profits threatened by increased production costs and underconsumption, 
sought to stabilize their own reproduction and productivity by cutting wages and entire 
positions.  Under these conditions, relief for families promoted consumption and 
managed demand with programs such as the supplemental food program for poor 
mothers.  However, the most important program mirrored the profit motives of capital;   
by augmenting the annual earnings of low-income families, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) incentivized low-wage work with much-needed means of consumption 
(Goldberg and Collins 2001).   
In addition, with the rising number of dual-income households, access to and use 
of credit supported family consumption.  The Equal Credit Opportunity Act banned 
discrimination in consumer loan and credit applications, providing for the first time, new 
means of consumption for non-whites and women, the Community Reinvestment Act 
obligated federally-insured depository institutions to invest in and serve their local 
populations, and a series of other consumer protections for credit reports, bankruptcy, and 
data disclosures legitimized credit and debt.  Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1978 
Marquette v. First of Omaha ruling dismantled state interest rate caps opening the credit 
industry to use higher rates.  With jobs and living wages becoming more elusive, the 
reproductive role of families waned and the capitalist welfare state sanctioned 
consumption with consumer credit and weakened financial regulations. 
Prolonged Decay and Initial Exploration: 1979-1992 
 The 1980s marked the emergence of a new era of exploration, even as the old 
SSA continued to decay.  Stagflation surfaced as minimal wage growth and productivity 
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regenerated low levels of investment and corporate profits.  The exploration for 
institutional alternatives targeted the wide-spread underconsumption of families by 
attempting to reinvigorate capital accumulation with access to low-wage work, and 
banking and credit services.  In this phase of “business ascendency,” as the post-WWII 
SSA continued to decay, a liberal structure of institutional alternatives (Wolfson and 
Kotz 2010) explored means to promote accumulation and consumption through work, not 
welfare.   
For example, the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act cut public assistance 
rolls while expanding mandatory WIN requirements, and subsequent amendments 
increased the age for full Social Security benefits while delaying cost of living increases.  
The 1988 Family Support Act replaced WIN with the JOBS Program, requiring women 
on welfare, even with children younger than three, to find work or enroll in training 
programs in exchange for basic benefits.  Characteristic of the shift toward work for 
welfare—workfare—under this conservative liberalization, the EITC was simultaneously 
expanded and indexed to inflation.   
Beginning with the 1980 repeal of regulations on state usury laws by the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, an environment of 
deregulation to promote capital mobility began to emerge.  Subsequently, the Garn-St. 
Germain Act and Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act eased mortgage interest 
rates and created a market that promoted household debt as mechanism for economic 
growth.  Later legislation followed this trend; the Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act lessened restrictions on mortgage-backed securities, the Tax Reform 
Act allowed for investments in these securities at different levels of risk, the Financial 
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Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act opened the housing sector to private 
mortgage firms, and in 1992 the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Security Act charged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase credit market access for 
underserved populations (Bostic and Lee 2009). 
 With a growing number of families necessarily seeking multiple incomes to 
supplement low wages and tax credits, easing mortgage market restrictions managed 
demand by arming financial capital with variable interest rates for consumer credit and 
mortgage loans, financing the most important family asset, their home.   
Neoliberalism 1992-2007 
 The liberal institutional structure of the 1980s and early 1990s bridged the former 
period of long-term stable human relations with this phase of short-term contracts and 
private economic gain (Harvey 2005).  Workfare became the hallmark of the capitalist 
welfare state as social security and welfare benefits were increasingly restricted.  Most 
profound, 1996 “welfare reform” replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families program (TANF).  TANF exemplifies neoliberalism’s mandate on short-
term, market-based contractual relations by obligating recipients to work despite 
increasing competition for even the most marginal jobs (Morgen et al. 2006).  As norms 
of reproduction, socialization, and consumption were increasingly harder to meet, the 
capitalist welfare state fixated on accumulation, leaving middle-class, working-class, and 
poor families impaired to act on their own behalf.   
Neoliberal financial deregulation progressed by lifting barriers restricting bank 
acquisition and merger activities.  In 1999, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act repealed Glass-
Steagall driving the growth of investment, commercial, and insurance banking 
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conglomerates.  Later, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act expanded the activities 
of financial firms that, coupled with HOME Investment Partnerships for low-income 
housing, the American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act, and American 
Dream Downpayment Initiative, the promotion of homeownership and consumer debt 
continually invigorated the expansion of credit markets.  Together, banks packaged these 
liabilities into derivatives—credit- and mortgage-backed securities—then sold, and re-
sold, these debt obligations to willing investors (Kotz 2009).   
Ultimately, the neoliberalization of the banking industry made it possible for 
financial capital to offer mortgage loans and consumer credit to risk-adverse, but willing 
families, historically discriminated against in housing and credit programs.  These 
subprime markets allowed families to contribute to the circuit of capital by refinancing 
old loans or originating new obligations under expanding consumption norms catalyzed 
by an industry ready to benefit from these marginalized groups (Howell 2006).  Finance 
capital balanced these risky loans with variable interest rates and potential profits by 
transferring the risk into securities markets.  
Summarized in Table 1, this institutional analysis argues that changes to capitalist 
welfare state assistance, from cash welfare for the economically marginalized to 
consumer credit and low-wage labor tax credits, led in part to the deterioration of families 
after World War II.  Underlying this shift is the changing primary relationship of the 
family as a capitalist institution from reproducing labor power to the consumption of 
goods and services.  As languishing incomes exacerbated inequalities and the downward 
mobility of middle, working, and poor families, consumer credit supplied financial 
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assistance for the means of consumption, and ultimately the deterioration of families 
through unprecedented levels of consumer debt.   
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Models and Variables 
Models and Expectations 
The following expectations compare changes to public cash assistance and the 
rate of consolidation by financial capital as exogenous variables with four endogenous 
measures of family economic deterioration in the post-WWII period.  Model 1 assesses 
total consumer credit outstanding; Model 2 estimates the ratio of household debt to 
disposable income; Model 3 measures the ratio of income inequality between the top 5 
percent and bottom forty percent of families; and Model 4 estimates the ratio of 
household liabilities to their asset values. 
Expectation #1: As the family’s primary institutional role shifts from reproduction 
to consumption, public cash assistance expenditures will have a negative relationship 
with outstanding consumer credit, as well as debt compared to disposable income, but a 
positive relationship with debt compared to assets.   
Expectation #2: Through the phases of the post-WWII SSA, changes in public 
cash assistance expenditures from welfare to workfare are expected to exacerbate a 
negative relationship with income inequalities between families. 
  Expectation #3:  Increased access to consumer credit through the deregulated 
financial sector contributes to family economic deterioration.  
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Variables 
National U.S. annual time-series data on public assistance, family deterioration, 
financial deregulation, and unemployment begin with the 1948 consolidation of the post-
WWII SSA in the United States through the start of the recession in December 2007.2     
Independent Variables 
Total public cash assistance expenditures on relief is the sum of capitalist welfare 
state expenditures through ADC/AFDC, TANF, EITC, and historical Aid to the Aged, 
Blind, Permanently and Totally Disabled, General Assistance, and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) programs. 
The number of total unassisted mergers of commercial banks provides a gauge of 
the deregulated finance industry’s impact on the circuit of capital.  As a measure of the 
pace of financialization, unassisted merger and acquisition activities promote profits by 
building a geographically broad clientele, constraining competition, and diversifying 
financial products (Spiegel and Gart 1996). 
The not seasonally adjusted unemployment rate is included to control for labor 
market fluctuations and business cycles.  
Dependent Variables 
For Model 1, the total consumer credit outstanding is the level of new and 
ongoing private credit obligations for consumption and subsistence, and incidence of debt 
poverty (Pressman and Scott 2009b).   
In Model 2, the household debt ratio compares the sum of new and outstanding 
home mortgage and consumer credit loans assumed by families with their ability to pay 
down these obligations through their disposable personal income.  Household credit 
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liabilities allow families to supplement or replace income and guarantee some level of 
purchasing power and effective demand (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008).  
Disposable personal income is the money available to households after taxes and 
transfers are deducted from their annual income.  
The liabilities-to-assets ratio in Model 4 compares outstanding household 
liabilities, as above, to the total current value of their assets by replacing disposable 
personal income with the total value of the family home and consumer durable goods. 
This ratio measures the relative change in family debt-to-assets, an indicator of the 
economic imbalance of families described as being “underwater” (Goodman 2009; 
Pressman and Scott 2009a). 
For Model 3, family income inequality compares changes in the aggregate share 
of total income going to the top 5 percent of families to that going to the bottom 40 
percent.  Often, changes in family income are measured for the “middle class,” however 
little agreement exists on a definition for this fluid demographic (Danziger and Haveman 
2001).  Juxtaposing the economic elite with the working poor and impoverished reflects 
relative changes in the gap between the most affluent and most vulnerable families.   
Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the four multivariate time-series regression 
analyses which demonstrate, to varying degrees, the relationship between family 
economic deterioration and changes in the capitalist welfare state through the progression 
of the post-WWII SSA. For each model, estimates of the unstandardized slope and 
standard coefficients (in parentheses), the processes responsible for autocorrelation in the 
residuals (error), the adjusted-R2 values and y-intercepts (constant), and the Chow 
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breakpoint tests (Chow LR Test) are provided.3   These observed relationships are not 
causal but correlational, and show the pattern of historically-contingent effects, most 
evident by considering the Chow breakpoint tests were the null hypothesis of stability 
across SSA phases is rejected for each model.   
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
The first empirical expectation anticipated that as the family’s primary 
institutional role shifts from reproduction to consumption, public cash assistance 
expenditures will have a negative relationship with consumer credit and the household 
debt ratio, but have a positive relationship with debt to assets.  The pattern of effects for 
total consumer credit outstanding (Model 1), the household debt ratio (Model 2), and the 
liabilities-to-assets ratio (Model 4) provide support for this expectation.  The standardized 
coefficients in Model 1 indicate that this relationship is very strong during both decay 
sub-phases (β = -.867 and β = -.837, respectively), and in the decay 2 sub-phase in 
Model 2 (β = -.858).  In the decay 1 sub-phase, provision of public cash assistance was 
expanded to support the reproductive role of families in response to rising social unrest 
exposing the contradictions of the post-WWII SSA.  However, swollen relief rolls put 
fiscal pressure on the capitalist welfare state and catalyzed popular backlash against 
welfare spending.  When economic growth slowed, and more families demanded relief, 
the means of consumption began to shift in the second decay sub-phase through 
legislation that opened consumer lending to minorities and women, and that promoted 
low-wage work with the EITC.  
In the prolonged decay and initial exploration phase, and amplified in the 
neoliberalism phase, increased access and use of credit mechanisms sustained the needs 
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of families to access means of consumption, but their expenditures on goods and services 
brought little in return to their net worth.  In Model 4, the expected pattern of effects in 
the latter two SSA phases (β = .540 and β = 1.0964, respectively) demonstrate how, 
concomitant continued policy shifts promoting workfare and consumer debt, liabilities 
outpaced growth in the value of assets, strengthening the correlation between 
consumption and the economic deterioration of families.  Together with the effects in 
Models 1 and 2, trading public welfare for low-wage tax credits is a strong predictor of 
increasing consumer debt.   
In the consolidation phase, middle-class families covered by the post-WWII SSA 
accords translated to a positive weak effect of cash assistance on outstanding consumer 
credit (β = .354).  This finding, though not outlined in the empirical expectations, is 
supported by SSA theory where the use of credit was purposeful in a stable institutional 
environment conducive for consumer confidence and capital accumulation (Kotz 2009).   
The estimates from Model 3 provide support for the second expectation that 
anticipated that changes in public cash assistance expenditures exacerbate inequalities 
between families.  The negative relationship between public cash assistance and income 
inequality in the second decay sub-phase (β = -.923) and in neoliberalism (β = -.781) 
reinforces the correlation between the promotion of low-wage employment and growing 
social inequalities.  In the first sub-phase of decay, when the balance of public cash 
assistance expenditures is dominated by publicly financed cash welfare, inequalities 
between families are unchanged.  However, in the following sub-phase, the 
unstandardized coefficient shows that for an annual decrease of $1 billion in cash 
assistance, there is an increase of .4 percent in income inequality.  The widening divide 
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between the top 5 percent and bottom 40 percent of the family income stratification, 
despite a growing number of dual-income households, accelerated as tax credits were 
unable to offset low-wages.  In the neoliberalism phase, this effect is greater, where 
income inequality is increased by 1.5 percent for each $1 billion decrease in public 
assistance spending. 
Finally, across all four models, the third expected relationship between the rate of 
change in the number of commercial bank mergers and the deterioration of families is 
observed during particular historical moments.  Expected across all SSA phases, and 
weakly corroborated in Model 1 (β = .108) and Model 3 (β = .172), significant positive 
effects are more prevalent in the consolidation period of rapid economic growth from 
1948-1966 and in the neoliberalism phase from 1993-2007 as the financial sector 
responded to rapid economic policy changes.  In the consolidation phase, low but 
significant increases in the rate of bank mergers aided the growth in the use of credit by 
the middle class (Model 1: β = .377; Model 4: β = .449).  For example, still regulated by 
the post-WWII regime, credit was low risk and relatively safe and offered to families 
covered by the capital-labor accord; thus, for every proportional increase in bank 
mergers, total consumer credit outstanding increased by $29.1 billion.  In addition, as 
banks continued to merge in neoliberalism, Model 3 shows that for a proportional change 
in the rate of bank mergers, the proportion of income going to the top 5 percent and the 
bottom 40 percent increased by 18.0 percent (β = .346).  Model 1 also supports this 
expectation where, in neoliberalism, outstanding consumer credit increased by $122.36 
billion for every proportional change in the rate of bank mergers (β = .433).   
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However, the significant negative relationship between the rate of mergers and 
household debt during neoliberalism in Model 2 was unexpected (β = -.260).  Here, the 
increased rates of bank mergers promoted access to consumer credit to purchase homes 
and durable goods, activities that provided capital with funds for reinvestment from 
interest payments on obligations.  As personal savings rates fell, eroding disposable 
incomes increased debt and slowed merger activities.  Another reason for this 
relationship, illuminated by the nonsignificant effect found in the neoliberalism phase in 
Model 4, where the rate of mergers promoted consumption, but for goods and services 
that brought little increase in the net worth of families. The absence of a significant effect 
may correspond to the need of the financial sector for effective demand, but less on the 
long-term value of household assets.   
Discussion 
These time-series models offer patterns of theoretically-informed effects 
conditioned by the macro-institutional analysis of the family as an institution in the post-
WWII SSA in the United States.  The economic security of families was established 
through the New Deal by stabilizing working conditions and compensation, the social 
safety net, and the banking industry.  These institutions also linked key family 
reproduction, socialization, and consumption roles to the capital accumulation as the 
benefits and wages of middle-class breadwinners and supported a stable circuit of capital.   
Over the next four decades, the contradictions of the New Deal between affluence 
and poverty exposed how families excluded from the post-WWII SSA languished.  As 
the economy stalled in the early 1970s, capital’s attempts to maintain profitability to the 
detriment of the working and middle classes generated a dilemma for the federal 
Running Head: The Economic Deterioration of the Family 
p. 21 
government between capital accumulation and the livelihood of citizens.  Subsequently, 
the negative relationship between public cash assistance and family economic 
deterioration was observed during the decay of the post-WWII SSA, particularly in the 
second sub-phase from 1974-1979.  Here, to support accumulation, barriers to consumer 
credit fell and public cash assistance began transitioning to private work-based relief. 
From the early 1980s through 2007, financial deregulation, social welfare 
retrenchment, emerging low-wage workfare, and expanding access to consumer credit 
promoted the new norms of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility.  For the 
capitalist welfare state, economic growth was linked to the consumption role of families, 
but who became insolvent long before the onset of the “Great Recession”.  Beginning in 
1993, for every billion dollars annually cut from public cash assistance expenditures the 
gap between the rich and the poor expanded by 1.5 percent; the top 5 percent of families 
clearly benefited from the financialization of the capitalist welfare state.  
The anticipated positive effects for unassisted bank mergers are most prevalent in 
the consolidation and neoliberalism phases.  Increasing socioeconomic inequality 
reinforced by consumer borrowing meant that families tapped their savings to pay down 
debts.  When banks merged and developed new means to exploit families as consumers, 
including loans against the value of their only wealth-generating asset, the family home, 
the proportional rate of mergers created a $122.4 billion increase annually in total 
consumer credit outstanding.  When defaults on these financial obligations increased, 
over-leveraging the family burst the credit and housing markets and the economic 
deterioration of the family proved detrimental to financial capital.   
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Limitations and Implications 
Though combining multiple modes of inquiry provide provisional and 
correlational evidence for historically-contingent relationships, further research is needed.  
For example, the institutional analysis discussed the capitalist-state-citizen accord and 
capital-labor accord, as well as the financial regulatory regime; however, the time-series 
models focus on the relationships between the family, the state, and capital.  The family 
household provides critical support to capital and labor power (Kotz 1994), but this 
relationship has traditionally been anchored by SSA theory in the capital-labor accord; 
these models refocus the family as an institution in the capitalist-state-citizen accord.  To 
strengthen these models, a measure of labor’s strength relative to capital that impacts the 
economic wellbeing of families, such as the cost of the risk labor takes in escalating 
conflicts with management or the decline in union membership, could be incorporated 
(Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1989). 
A second substantive limitation is the impact of taxes on the economic wellbeing 
of families.  For example, low-wage earners, as a percentage of total income, lose more 
to taxes both upfront in the form of payroll taxes and through sales tax and federal excise 
taxes often passed on to consumers by businesses (Hassett and Moore 2006).   Moreover, 
taxes levied on capital gains from the economic investments of affluent families have 
traditionally redistributed income from the top to the bottom of the income bracket 
through social spending.  However, cuts to capital gains taxes, promoted as a means to 
stimulate economic growth, redistribute income upward intensifying income inequalities 
(Boyer 2010).  In future work should incorporate a measure of personal taxes for both the 
bottom and top of the family income distribution.  
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Despite these limitations, this analysis details attempts by the capitalist welfare 
state of the post-WWII United States to negotiate contradictions between the economic 
conditions for the reproduction of the family and for the reproduction of capital, leading 
up to the latest capitalist crisis.  Through the phases of the post-WWII SSA, the family’s 
primary contribution to the circuit of capital shifted from reproduction to consumption as 
the strategic balance of welfare for capital and welfare for families defined the conditions 
of existence.  This change, from a publicly provided safety net for social reproduction to 
private self-sufficient consumption, underscores the economic deterioration of families in 
the name of capital accumulation.    
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Data Appendix 
 
Independent Variables 
Total Public Cash Assistance Expenditures are the sum total payments for Aid to 
the Aged, Blind, Permanently and Totally Disabled, and General Assistance.  Data for 
1960-1973 come from Carter et al. (2006: Bf634, Bf635, Bf636, Bf638); 1948-1949, 
1951-1954, and 1956-1959 were missing from later estimates, therefore early estimates 
were used (Carter et al. 2006: Bf621, Bf622, Bf623, Bf625).   
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) expenditure series 1960-1997, come from Carter et al. (2006: Bf634, Bf635, 
Bf636, Bf638); 1948-1949, 1951-1954, 1956-1959 were missing from the later estimates, 
therefore early estimates for 1948-1959 were used (Carter et al. 2006: Bf621, Bf622, 
Bf623, Bf625).   
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) expenditures for 1998-2007 
were obtained from the Administration for Children and Families (2009: Table F, Line 5 
for selected years).  
Total Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments, which replaced earlier Aid 
to the Aged, Blind, Disabled and General Assistance programs in 1974, were obtained for 
1974-1998 from Carter et al. (2006: Bf600 and  Bf601); data for 1999-2007 come from 
the Social Security Administration (2008: Table 7.A4; 2010: Table 7.A4). 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) payments, first implemented in 1975, are 
reported in the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income data (IRS-SOI); data for 
1975-1994 come from the Tax Policy Institute (2011) and for 1995-2007 from the IRS-
SOI (2010, selected years).  
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The total number of unassisted commercial bank mergers is the annual sum of 
unassisted voluntary mergers, consolidations or absorptions of two or more institutions 
reported by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2010). 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (2010) not seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rate, controlling for business cycle effects, is the percentage of the total labor force 16 
years and older without jobs but available and actively seeking work, or on temporary 
layoff even if not actively seeking employment. 
Dependent Variables 
Total consumer credit outstanding is the annual (calendar year) average of 
monthly reported levels of not seasonally adjusted outstanding consumer credit at 
month’s end (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2010b). 
Total household liabilities come from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds 
Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations (2010a: Table B. 100) and are 
the sum of home mortgage (line 33) and consumer credit (line 34) balances outstanding at 
the end of the calendar year.  Total household assets are the sum of the value of the 
household (line 4) and consumer durable goods at current replacement costs (line 7). 
Disposable personal income (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010: Table 2.1, Line 
26) is the annual average of seasonally adjusted quarterly income from wage 
compensation and supplements from employers, and other forms of income, less 
contributions to governmental insurance programs and taxes.  The use of disposable 
personal income controls for wage levels, changes in population, price fluctuations, and 
the general volume of economic activity (Teplin 2001). 
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Together, the household debt ratio is the total household liabilities per dollar of 
disposable personal income.  Other measures comparing debt to income exist (Bucks et 
al. 2009), but do not for the earliest years needed for this analysis.  The liabilities-to-
assets ratio is the total household liabilities per dollar of the total household assets. 
Family Income Inequality is the simple division of the proportion of aggregate 
family income of the bottom two quintiles into the top 5 percent across all families as 
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2009).  
Time-Series Analysis Procedures 
The form of each univariate series was determined first by examining time-series 
plots across the entire post-WWII SSA and within each of the identified sub-phases.  
Next, univariate descriptive statistics, Jarque-Bera tests for normality, examination of 
correlograms and Ljung-Box Q-statistics to assess autocorrelation and nonstationarity in 
the mean of each series, and performance of Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
unit root tests were conducted (for a description of these tests see Cromwell, Labys, and 
Terraza 1994).  If the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected (p < 0.05), the series 
was differenced appropriately and tests for normality and autocorrelation were repeated 
until the series was stationary.  A final univariate model was estimated with 
autoregressive and/or moving average parameters to correct for these processes.   
Next, a Chow breakpoint stability test examined historical stability by comparing 
the full post-WWII series model with separate models for each post-WWII SSA phase 
under the null hypothesis that each does not vary across these theoretically derived 
phases of economic growth and decline; stability was rejected when the likelihood ratio 
statistic is significant (p < 0.10), supporting the hypothesis of historical contingency.  
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Separate period-specific univariate models were estimated to determine their proper form 
and tested for normality, stationarity, and independence, and accepted when Q-statistics 
in the first 2 lags failed to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity (p < 0.05).5 
Next, each measure of family economic deterioration was regressed separately on 
each independent variable to determine bivariate relationships across and within SSA 
phases.  Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation processes were diagnosed in the 
residuals, correlograms and Ljung-Box Q-statistics for nonstationarity were consulted, 
and if independent errors in the residuals were rejected (p < .05), autoregressive and/or 
moving average parameters were added to correct for these processes.  The bivariate 
models were then re-estimated and accepted when Q-statistics and Jarque-Bera tests 
signaled stationarity and normality.  The final model was tested with the White’s test for 
heteroskedasticity under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (p < .05); if needed, the 
model was re-estimated using White’s correction to produce robust standard error 
estimates and t-test statistics.  Finally, a Chow breakpoint test for each bivariate model 
across phases of the post-WWII SSA rejected the null hypothesis of stability (p < .10), 
showing a significant difference between each family economic deterioration variable 
and each predictor.6 
Multivariate models were estimated first through a null model of bank mergers 
and unemployment, then by adding public cash assistance.  The residuals of these models 
were assessed for stationarity through Q-statistics, Jarque-Bera tests for normality, 
White’s tests for heteroskedasticity, and Chow breakpoint tests for stability.  Corrections 
were made until the residuals were stationary, normally distributed, and corrected for any 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Additional tests on models with multiple independent variables were conducted to 
assess the stability of slope coefficients and presence of multicollinearity.  While 
estimates remain robust with multicollinearity and inflated standard errors, it becomes 
more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship (Agresti and Finlay 2008). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) assessed the impact of highly correlated predictor 
variables on the variance of the parameter estimates.   Collinearity was rejected when the 
VIF was greater than 2.5 (Allison 1999) and, to determine if estimates were impacted, 
models were re-estimated excluding one collinear variable.   
Due to the close historical relationship between public assistance and 
unemployment (Piven et al. 2002), moderate multicollinearity within the neoliberal phase 
(VIF values range between 2.85 to 3.81) exists, but does not within other phases or across 
the full post-WWII SSA.   
Second, the condition index is a measure of the numerical stability of slope 
coefficients affected by collinearity.  Unstable slope estimates are not reliable predictors 
of relationships between the affected independent and dependent variables.  All models in 
this analysis, even those showing moderate VIF values greater than 2.5 possess condition 
indices less than the cut-off of 30.0 (Belsley 1991), supporting the numerical stability of 
all estimates. 
Finally, each measure of family economic deterioration was regressed on public 
cash assistance expenditures, the unassisted mergers of commercial banks, and the not 
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate across the full post-WWII SSA and each sub-
phase.  Model diagnostics followed the same procedures as above, including rejecting 
independent errors in the residuals through autocorrelation and partial autocorrelations 
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functions and associated Ljung–Box Q-statistics (p < 0.05).  In the presence of serial 
correlation, autoregressive and/or moving average parameters were added to the model 
until stationarity was achieved.  Normality of the residuals was tested using the Jarque-
Bera test, and the White’s test for heteroskedasticity was performed.  Finally, the Chow 
breakpoint test rejected model stability across the phases of the post-WWII SSA (p < .10) 
thus full post-WWII and SSA phase-specific results for the relationships between public 
assistance and family economic deterioration are provided. 
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Table 1: Institutional Conditions Across Phases of the Post-WWII SSA 
SSA Phase 
Institutional Conditions 
Family Conditions of Existence Capitalist-State-
Citizen Accord 
Capital-Labor 
Accord Financial Regime 
Consolidation 
1948-1966 
Cash Assistance and 
Capitalist Welfare State 
Provisions 
• Social Security 
Expansion 
• AFDC Expansion 
• Civil Rights Reforms 
• Community Action 
Agencies 
Industrial 
Democracy and Full 
Employment 
• Landrum-Griffin 
• MDTA 
• Affirmative 
Action and Equal 
Pay 
Fiscal Stabilization 
and Urban Support 
• Low-Income 
Housing Programs 
• Urban 
Redevelopment 
Initiatives 
• Regulation Q 
Structural: 
• Normative family promotes 
stability 
 
Institutional: 
• Social Reproduction 
 
Economic: 
• Rising median family incomes 
• Decreasing poverty rates 
• Unemployment less than 4% 
• Low, but growing debt obligations 
Decay 1 
1966-1973 
Increase in Assistance; 
First Work Mandates 
• Work Mandated for 
Public Assistance 
(WIN) 
• Jobs Training 
Programs (CEP/JOBS) 
• SSI Established 
Employability and 
Jobs Training 
• CETA 
• Equal 
Employment and 
Civil Rights 
Amendments 
Mortgage Promotion 
and Credit Protection 
• Fannie Mae and 
Secondary 
Mortgage Markets 
• Consumer 
Protection 
• Fair Credit 
Regulations 
Structural: 
• Civil rights and market diversity; 
• Rise of single-parent mothers  
 
Institutional: 
• Social Reproduction 
 
Economic: 
• Slowly rising median incomes 
• Poverty rates under 10% 
• Unemployment near 5% 
• Stable consumer spending 
Decay 2 
1973-1979 
Enforcement of Welfare 
and Work Provisions 
• Supplemental Food 
Program (WIC) 
• EITC 
 Credit and Debt for 
the Middle Class 
• Lending as 
Community 
Reinvestment 
• Fair Credit and 
Debt Regulations, 
cont. 
• Bankruptcy 
Protections 
• Supreme Court’s 
Marquette Decision 
 
Structural: 
• Women entering workforce; 
• Dual income households 
 
Institutional: 
• Reproduction waning; 
Consumption promoted 
 
Economic: 
• Stagnating median incomes 
• Poverty rates over 9% 
• 6% Unemployment 
• Consumer credit increases 
Prolonged 
Decay and 
Initial 
Exploration 
1979-1992 
Growth of Workfare and 
Welfare Retrenchment 
• Welfare Roll 
Reductions; Spending 
Cuts 
• Workfare through 
FSA and JOBS  
Business 
Ascendancy 
• Liberalization of 
Labor Relations 
• Declining 
Unionization 
Financial 
Deregulation 
• Easing Credit 
Controls 
• Tax Reforms to 
Promote Mortgage 
Debt 
• Federal Housing 
Assistance and 
GSE Expansion 
Structural: 
• Rebalancing labor and household 
norms 
 
Institutional: 
• Consumption 
 
Economic: 
• Flat median incomes 
• Poverty rising to 12% 
• 7% unemployment 
• Growing household debt 
Neoliberal 
Exploration 
1992-2007 
End of Cash Assistance 
and Institutionalization 
of Workfare 
• Welfare Reform and 
TANF 
• ADDI 
 
 Fiscal Mechanisms 
• Financial Product 
Innovation 
• Relaxing Barriers 
between Financial 
Institutions 
• Bankruptcy Reform 
• Growth in 
Subprime Markets 
Structural: 
• Financial capacity promoted 
despite labor market status 
 
Institutional: 
• Deregulated Consumption 
 
Economic: 
• Slow median income growth 
• Poverty rate near 10% 
• Unemployment between 4-7% 
• Rapid growth in debt obligations 
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Table 2: Models of Family Economic Deterioration  
 
Full SSA 
1948-2007 
Consolidation 
1948-1966 
Decay 1 
1967-
1973 
Decay 2 
1974-
1979 
Prolonged 
Decay and 
Initial 
Exploration 
1980-1992 
Neoliberalism 
1993-2007 
Model 1, Total Consumer Credit Outstanding 
Public Cash 
Assistance 
-1.141 
(-.088) 
7.543+ 
(.354) 
-7.590* 
(-.867) 
-5.981* 
(-.837) 
-2.440 
(-.160) 
1.369 
(.133) 
Unassisted 
Mergers  
23.757** 
(.108) 
29.055* 
(.377) 
-10.855 
(-.088) 
2.404 
(.013) 
22.132 
(.101) 
122.357** 
(.433) 
Unemployment  -11.337** (-.335) 
-4.712+ 
(-.319) 
13.451+ 
(.503) 
-17.009+ 
(-.414) 
-15.078 
(-.318) 
-.869 
(-.015) 
Constant 107.751** 45.354* -5.388 149.020+ 127.247 10.498 
Error AR(1) MA(1) MA(1) WNR WNR AR(1) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Adj. R2 .686 .498 .681 .842 .273 .696 
Chow LR Test 52.401**      
Model 2, Household Debt Ratio 
Public Cash 
Assistance 
.000 
(-.050) 
.002 
(.181) 
-.003 
(-.556) 
-.003* 
(-.858) 
.001 
(.174) 
.000 
(-.067) 
Unassisted 
Mergers   
.006 
(.057) 
.028* 
(.465) 
.006 
(.082) 
.010 
(.112) 
.005 
(.065) 
-.039+ 
(-.260) 
Unemployment  -.001 (-.041) 
.001 
(.068) 
.007 
(.453) 
-.005 
(-.263) 
-.005 
(-.296) 
.021* 
(.695) 
Constant .020 .014 -.028 .051 .039 -.068 
Error AR(1) WNR WNR WNR AR(1) AR(1) 
Adj. R2 .410 .134 .000 .896 .117 .585 
Chow LR Test 32.273*      
Model 3, Income Inequality 
Public Cash 
Assistance 
.000 
(.011) 
.002 
(.058) 
.003 
(.269) 
-.004* 
(-.923) 
.001 
(.133) 
-.015* 
(-.781) 
Unassisted 
Mergers 
.042+ 
(.172) 
.061 
(.278) 
.060 
(.360) 
-.034 
(-.308) 
.024 
(.172) 
.180* 
(.346) 
Unemployment .012** (.315) 
.021* 
(.493) 
.009 
(.250) 
-.007 
(.294) 
.008 
(.256) 
.104* 
(1.003) 
Constant -.060* -.112* -.050 -.029 -.036 -.491+ 
Error WNR WNR WNR WNR WNR WNR; # 
Adj. R2 .100 .242 .000 .630 .000 .328 
Chow LR Test 24.106+      
Model 4, Liabilities-to-Assets Ratio 
Public Cash 
Assistance  
.002* 
(.267) 
.002 
(.113) 
-.001 
(-.273) 
.001 
(.229) 
.003+ 
(.540) 
.010** 
(1.096) 
Unassisted 
Mergers 
.013 
(.090) 
.050* 
(.449) 
-.032 
(-.519) 
.040 
(.419) 
.003 
(.040) 
-.032 
(-.132) 
Unemployment -.004 (-.197) 
.000 
(-.017) 
.007+ 
(.502) 
-.012 
(-.607) 
.001 
(.034) 
-.037* 
(-.762) 
Constant .039+ .041 -.044 .074 -.003 .194+ 
Error AR(1) WNR AR(1) WNR WNR WNR 
Adj. R2 .267 .055 .454 .356 .040 .263 
Chow LR Test 30.093+      
Notes:  One-tailed significance levels:   **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10   (constant is two-tailed) 
Error Codes:  WNR = white noise residuals; AR(1) = autoregressive, order 1; MA(1) = moving average, order 1;  
#White’s Corrected Standard Errors for Heteroskedasticity; Standardized Coefficients are in parentheses 
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Notes 
1 The phases of the post-WWII SSA are provided in Table 1.  Theoretical disagreement exists on whether a 
newly consolidated SSA formed in the early 1990s; this analysis considers the most recent phase a 
prolonged neoliberal exploration (McDonough 2008).   
 
2 Detailed definitions and sources for each variable are provided in the Data Appendix. 
 
3 Time-series model building procedures are described in detail in the Data Appendix 
 
4 Inflated standard betas are expected due to micronumerocity within short time series (Goldberger 1991) 
and, shaped by historically-contingent shifts in social conditions, enlarged variances and moderate 
multicollinearity during the decay 2 and neoliberalism phases exist.  Strong statistical results in the 
presence of micronumerocity are favorable, as is the case here.  Where traditional practices may outright 
dismiss such estimates, it is more prudent to interpret effects within historical conditions (Griffin 1992). 
 
5 The final form of each series is as follows: public cash assistance is first-differenced; total consumer 
credit outstanding is first-differenced except in neoliberalism where it is second-differenced; the household 
debt ratio is first-differenced; income inequality is first-differenced; the liabilities-to-assets ratio is first-
differenced; the total unassisted mergers of commercial banks is the first-difference of the natural log; and 
unemployment is in levels. 
 
6 A p-value of .10 is used rather than the customary .05 because the number of degrees of freedom in the 
separate SSA phase models is low relative to the number of predictor variables and likely to result in large 
standard error estimates.  In addition, these are not sample data; significance tests are used to rule out 
chance findings rather than to draw inferences about a population.  
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